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a b  s  t  r a  c t
We  derive  optimal rules  for  paying hospitals  for  non-emergency  care  when  providers
choose quality and  capacity,  and  patient demand is rationed by  waiting  time. Waiting  for
treatment is costly  for  patients,  so  that  hospital  payment  rules  should  take  account of their
effect  on waiting  time  as well  as on quality.  Since deterministic waiting time  models  imply
that profit maximising  hospitals  will never  choose  to  have both  positive  quality  and  pos-
itive  waiting  time,  we develop  a stochastic  model of rationing by  waiting in  which  both
quality  and  expected  waiting  are  positive  in equilibrium.  We  use it to  show that,  although
a prospective  output price gives hospitals  an incentive  to  attract patients by  raising  quality
and  reducing  waiting times, it must  be  supplemented  by  a price attached to  hospital  deci-
sions  on quality or  capacity  or to a performance indicator which  depends  on those decisions
(such as average waiting  time,  or  average length of stay). A prospective  output  price  by  itself
can support  the  optimal  quality  and  waiting  time  distribution  only if  the  welfare  function
respects  patient  preferences over quality and waiting  time, if  patients’  marginal  rates  of
substitution between quality and  waiting  time are  independent of income,  and if  waiting
for  treatment  does  not reduce  the productivity  of patients.  If  these  conditions do not  hold,
supplementing  the  output  price with  a reward linked  to  the  hospital’s  cost  can increase
welfare,  though  it is possible  that  costs should  be taxed rather  than subsidised.
©  2019 The Authors.  Published by  Elsevier B.V. This  is  an  open  access article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Public hospital systems, like those in  Scandinavia, the
UK, and other OECD countries, are  mainly financed through
general taxation or compulsory social insurance. Patients
face zero or very low money prices and elective (non-
emergency) treatment is  rationed by  waiting times which
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are  often long and a  source of concern to  both patients
and policy makers (Cullis et al., 2000; Siciliani and Iversen,
2012).1 Hospitals in  these systems are increasingly paid
prospectively for each case treated (Paris et al., 2010) and
in some countries there are attempts to improve hospital
quality by linking payment directly to quality as well as
to output (Jha et al., 2012; Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016;
Sutton et al., 2012).
In this paper we derive optimal rules for paying hospi-
tals in a public health care system in  which patient demand
1 For example, the median waiting time from being placed on the wait-
ing  list for hip replacement to  treatment in 2011  was 108 days in Australia,
113 in Finland, 87 in Portugal, and 82  in England (Siciliani et al.,  2014). See
Cullis et al. (2000), Iversen and Siciliani (2011) and Siciliani and Iversen
(2012) for surveys of the health economics waiting time literature.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.102277
0167-6296/© 2019 The Authors. Published by  Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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for elective health care is rationed by waiting time and hos-
pitals can choose quality and make capacity decisions that
change the distribution of waiting times facing patients.
In the normative literature on hospital payment systems
the policy objective is to  induce welfare maximising hospi-
tal behaviour: treatment of an optimal number of patients
with optimal quality at minimum cost. (See Chalkley and
Malcomson (2000) for a  review.) In this literature it is
assumed that payment cannot be linked directly to  unver-
ifiable or unobserved quality or to  cost reducing effort.
Policy makers are restricted to setting a  price for output
and to reimbursing hospitals for their costs.
The key paper is  Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) which
shows that, if there is  only one dimension of quality and
it is optimal to treat all patients who demand care at the
optimal quality, so that there is  no rationing, then first best
quality and output can be achieved at minimum cost with
a single instrument: a  prospective output price.2 Because
higher quality attracts more patients and increases rev-
enue, hospitals respond to  a higher price by  increasing
quality. It is possible to set the price so that the hospital
chooses the optimal quality and this results in the opti-
mal  number of patients being treated. And with no cost
reimbursement the hospital bears all the costs of producing
care and so has the appropriate incentive for cost reducing
effort. Remarkably, this result does not depend on the pol-
icy maker and patients having the same valuation of quality
and the benefits of treatment. It  is not  even necessary that
patients correctly perceive quality when demanding care,
only that their demand is increasing in  quality as perceived
by the policy maker. Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) also
show that if quality is  multi-dimensional, the first best is
implementable via the output price only if the policy maker
and all patients have the same marginal rates of substitu-
tion between different quality dimensions.
The insights from this literature are obtained from mod-
els which do not take account of a salient feature of most
public health care systems: rationing by waiting time for
non-emergency treatment.3 Longer waiting times impose
costs on patients: their health gain from treatment is
delayed, longer delays can worsen treatment outcomes
(Nikolova et al., 2015; Reichert and Jacobs, 2018), and
patients may  be unable to  work whilst waiting (Aakvik
et al., 2015). These costs from higher waiting times lead
patients to switch within the public sector to hospitals with
2 Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) examine three types of solution: (i)
optimal output is equal to the number demanding care at the optimal
quality (“demand constrained”); (ii)  optimal output is  equal to the  exoge-
nous fixed capacity (“capacity constrained”); (iii) optimal output is  less
than  the minimum of capacity and demand (“unconstrained”). In cases
(ii)  and (iii), where demand exceeds output, a  price attached to  the num-
ber of patients demanding treatment is  required in addition to  the price
on  output, i.e., on the number of patients treated.
3 In their two solution types where demand exceeds supply Chalkley
and  Malcomson (1998, pp. 1106–7) note that welfare depends on how
patients are rationed but only consider the implications of perfect
rationing (all patients treated have higher benefits that those who are
not  selected for treatment) and of random rationing. Neither method of
rationing is assumed to impose any direct costs on  patients (other than not
being treated if not selected) and patient demand is  assumed unaffected
by the probability of treatment.
lower waiting times (Sivey, 2012), to  opt for private hospi-
tals (Besley et al., 1999) or  to  forgo care entirely (Gravelle
et al., 2002; Martin and Smith, 1999; Windmeijer et al.,
2005). In addition to  their effects on output and quality,
design of payment schemes should therefore take account
of their effects on waiting time and on the costs wait-
ing times impose on patients and on income insurance
schemes.
Recognition that waiting time affects patient utility
from treatment and that there may  be production losses if
patient labour supply is reduced when waiting for treat-
ment means that, even if there is  only one dimension
of quality of care, there are two  dimensions of hospital
decisions which affect welfare. Thus the optimal payment
mechanism needs at least one instrument in addition to a
prospective output price.
But waiting time cannot be analysed as though it is
just another type of quality: it is  determined by hospital
supply decisions and by patient decisions about whether
to demand treatment. Analysis of the effect of hospital
payment regimes must therefore take account of how equi-
librium is  established in this market. Demand is uncertain
because of the uncertain incidence of illness, and length
of stay is also uncertain because of unobserved patient
characteristics and supply shocks. Thus waiting times are
uncertain and their distribution is  determined by both
patient and hospital decisions.
Following Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), almost all
economic models of rationing by waiting in  health care
assume that demand and supply, and hence waiting time,
are certain.4 In  these models the certain waiting time
adjusts, like the money price in  standard markets, to  ensure
that the certain demand equals the certain supply. Such
deterministic waiting time models are useful for some pur-
poses but not for the analysis of hospital responses to
payment regimes when demand is affected by quality as
well as waiting time.
To see this, consider a hospital that faces a fixed price
for output and does not care about quality per se and which
has a  certain and positive waiting time determined by
the equality of certain demand and its certain output. If
it reduces quality, holding its output constant, its waiting
time will fall to keep demand equal to output. Profit will
increase: the reduction in quality will reduce cost and rev-
enue is unchanged because output is  unchanged. Hence, a
profit maximising hospital whose revenue varies with the
volume of patients treated will never choose to have both
positive waiting time and positive quality even if such a
combination maximises welfare. In deterministic models
of rationing by waiting, the only way  to explain the coex-
istence of positive waiting times and positive quality is by
assuming sufficiently great intrinsic provider concern with
quality.
By contrast, models in  which demand and supply, and
hence waiting times, are  stochastic can be used to  analyse
hospital choices which affect quality and waiting times. In
such a setting, the mean number treated is equal to  the
4 See, for example, Marchand and Schroyen (2005), Brekke et al. (2008)
and Gravelle and Siciliani (2008).
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mean demand and is strictly less than the capacity of the
hospital. The equilibrium mean waiting time  is always pos-
itive since only an infinitely large capacity can result in  all
patients having a  zero realised waiting time. A reduction in
quality with unchanged capacity will reduce hospital cost
but, as we show, it will also reduce the equilibrium mean
demand and hence the mean number treated and the mean
revenue. Hence expected profit could decrease or increase
when quality is reduced. The equilibrium of the system will
always have positive expected waiting time and, if quality
is  not too costly, also have positive quality.5
Two papers in the health economics literature have
considered stochastic waiting time models with demand
depending on the distribution of waiting times.6 In
Goddard et al. (1995) it is assumed that a patient observes
the length of the waiting list before deciding whether to
join the list. The resulting complicated expressions for the
steady state probabilities of the number of patients in  the
system and for expected waiting time are used to  derive
comparative static predictions about the effects of patient
income and the price of private care. Iversen and Lurås
(2002) use a simpler queueing model to examine competi-
tion between GPs via their choice of quality and expected
waiting time.
Our first contribution is  to develop a  model of rationing
by random waiting times which has firm welfare foun-
dations, and is  analytically tractable. Because we  use our
model for normative rather than positive analysis, we
derive demand functions for treatment from patient pref-
erences over income, quality and waiting times, rather
than making plausible but ad hoc  assumptions about the
demand functions, as in Goddard et al. (1995) and Iversen
and Lurås (2002). We  use a welfare function based on these
preferences to examine policy options. Like Iversen and
Lurås (2002) we take an ex  ante, or rational expectations,
approach, though we have a  more general specification
of the queueing model and of individual preferences.7 In
the rational expectations equilibrium individuals decide
whether to seek public treatment on the basis of an
anticipated waiting time distribution and their decisions
generate the anticipated distribution. By contrast with
Goddard et al. (1995), our specification yields an equi-
librium steady state distribution of waiting times for the
public system with reasonably simple properties.8
5 We contrast the equilibria of deterministic and stochastic waiting
time models diagrammatically in footnote 22  in Section 2.4.  For a  fuller
comparison of stochastic and deterministic rationing by waiting see
Gravelle and Schroyen (2016).
6 There are stochastic waiting time models of hospitals in the operations
research literature (see  the  survey by  Fomundam and Herrmann (2007).
But none of these allow for balking: patient decisions to  join the wait-
ing  list being affected by the distribution of waiting times. Some of the
queuing literature does consider balking (Hassin and Haviv, 2003). Here
analyses of pricing have focussed on  the use of user charges to influence
demand and curb congestion, rather than on provider prices to encourage
supply and quality. For economic analyses of user charges in stochastic
queueing models see  Edelson and Hildebrand (1975),  Naor (1969), and
Littlechild (1974).
7 For example, we allow demand to  depend on the distribution of wait-
ing  times not just on the mean waiting time.
8 The  ex ante formulation also explains the purchase of supplemen-
tary insurance against the  cost of private treatment by individuals before
Our second contribution is to  extend Chalkley and
Malcomson (1998) by using our  waiting time model to
derive first and second-best payment schemes for a  hos-
pital treating publicly funded elective patients who are
rationed by waiting. The payment schemes depend on their
effects on the hospital’s quality and capacity decisions, and
the resulting impacts on the equilibrium waiting time dis-
tribution. The hospital bears the costs of capacity and of
treating patients but it does not take full account of the
benefits of treatment for patients. It  also ignores any output
losses due to patients being less productive whilst ill and
waiting for treatment and the fact that the payments to  the
hospital are financed by distortionary taxation. A welfare
maximum can be achieved with a  payment scheme which
ensures that the marginal revenues for the hospital from
capacity and quality decisions are equal to their residual
marginal welfare effects: the marginal social benefits and
costs which the hospital would otherwise ignore.
If there is a  single quality dimension and a  single hospi-
tal capacity decision affecting the distribution of patient
waiting times, achieving the first best quality and dis-
tribution of waiting times requires that the prospective
output price must be  combined with another instrument,
for example, a payment related to  average length of stay, or
to quality, or to  the mean waiting time. The optimal price
per patient treated is  higher the greater are the marginal
social benefits of capacity and quality, the weaker is  hospi-
tal altruism, the smaller is  the marginal cost of public funds,
and the greater is the effect of waiting lists and waiting
times on the costs of insuring patients against lost earn-
ings whilst waiting for care. If the other price is  attached to
quality, as in  a  Pay for Performance scheme, it should be less
than the residual marginal welfare effect of quality because
the price attached to output is  already indirectly incentivis-
ing  quality given that demand increases with quality.
In the second best where the prospective output price
is the only instrument it should exceed the first best price
because it has to incentivise two decisions (quality and
capacity). In the absence of other policy instruments an
output price can support first best quality and capacity
decisions only if  marginal and infra-marginal patients are
willing to  trade off waiting times and quality at the same
rate, and if there is  no loss of output whilst patients are
waiting for treatment. If these strong conditions do not
hold it is likely that  supplementing the output price with
a  payment linked to  hospital costs will increase welfare.
However, because welfare depends on both quality and
capacity and, at the second best output price, the marginal
welfare effects of quality and capacity may  have oppo-
site signs, it is  possible that hospital costs should be taxed
rather than subsidised.
In Section 2 we present the waiting time model and
patient choices between public and private treatment,
examine the effects of hospital choice of quality and capac-
ity decisions on the equilibrium demand and the waiting
they fall ill. This decision must be made  ex ante and so be based on
unconditional expectations about the distribution waiting times, not the
distribution conditional on the number waiting at the date the individual
falls ill.
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time distribution, and set out the welfare function. In Sec-
tion 3 we derive the first best hospital payment scheme
when a prospective price per patient treated is combined
with a price linked to a  performance measure affected by
quality or capacity decisions. Second best pricing rules and
cost subsidisation are considered in Section 4.  Section 5
concludes.
2. Model
2.1. Queueing model
Our model of the queueing process is general and, unlike
most stochastic queueing models, we allow demand (the
arrival process) to depend on the distribution of waiting
times.9 Our focus is on obtaining a  tractable model of the
resulting market equilibrium in order to analyse welfare
maximising payment schemes for public hospitals.
We  assume that the event that  an individual becomes
ill and requires elective treatment is  identically and inde-
pendently distributed with probability . All  patients have
the same illness severity and the same health gain from
treatment. Those who choose to be  treated in  the public
hospital are placed on a waiting list  and are treated in  order
of arrival: the queue discipline is “first come, first served”.
The time w from joining the list to  discharge after treat-
ment varies with the number of patients already on the list
which depends on the random process generating arrivals
and on the random length of stay of patients once admit-
ted. The random arrival rate is  determined by the illness
probability and by patient decisions about whether to be
treated in the public hospital. The mean rate of arrivals at
the public hospital per unit of time is  and we assume
that  completely describes the distribution of arrivals per
unit of time.10 In this and the next section we  treat  as
exogenous and then in Section 2.3 we  explain how it is
determined by the decisions of patients about whether they
wish to be treated in the public hospital when ill.
The hospital can influence the distribution of length of
stay by decisions on the number of beds, operating theatres,
staffing levels, and managerial effort to  improve coordi-
nation between different departments. We denote these
decisions by s and will usually assume that s is a scalar and
refer to it as capacity.11
We assume that the stochastic processes governing
additions to the list  and length of stay imply that the total
time w between referral to the hospital and completed
treatment has a  steady state distribution function
H(w; , s), H < 0, Hs > 0. (1)
9 See Taylor and Karlin (1998, Ch. 9) or Gross et  al. (2008, Ch. 2) for
expositions of queueing theory.
10 As in queuing theory where the most common assumption is that
the  arrival rate has a  Poisson distribution. And, as in this literature, we
assume that the population from which arrivals come is  infinite, so that
the  probability of  an arrival in any time interval is  independent of the
number of previous arrivals (see Gross et  al.,  2008: 85).
11 We discuss the implications of multiple hospital decisions affecting
waiting time in Section 3.3 and Appendix F.
where increases in the arrival rate  and reductions
in capacity s produce first degree stochastic dominating
changes in the distribution of waiting times. The mean
waiting time is  increasing in the arrival rate and decreasing
in capacity:
w(, s)
def
=
∫ ∞
0
wdH(w; , s), w > 0, ws < 0. (2)
Main symbols and definitions are given in Table 1.
2.2. Patients
Compulsory public health insurance covers the costs
of treatment in the public hospital and a  public earnings
insurance scheme reimburses some or  all of earnings lost
due to illness. Both schemes are funded from general tax-
ation. Individuals have the same preferences but differ in
their incomes and those with a  sufficiently high income
choose to take out supplementary private insurance to
cover the cost of treatment in a private hospital.12
Income per unit of time y  when well is  distributed
over [ymin, ymax] with distribution function F(y). When ill,
earnings are reduced by ℓ(y) and reimbursement r(ℓ(y)) ∈
[0, ℓ(y)] is received from the public insurance scheme, so
that income when ill is
yL(y) = y −  ℓ(y) + r(ℓ(y)),
dyL
dy
= 1 − ℓ′(y)(1 −  r′(ℓ(y))) ≥ 0,
(3)
where we assume that income when ill is non-decreasing
in income when well.13
Utility for a  patient treated in  a  public hospital who has
a  wait of w days from illness to discharge after treatment
is
u(y,  q, w)
def
= U1(yL(y))
∫ w
0
ı(t)dt +  U2(y, q)
∫ ∞
w
ı(t)dt, (4)
where uy > 0, uq > 0, uw < 0, U1 and U2 are flow utility per
day whilst waiting and post-treatment, ı(t) is the discount
factor and q is  hospital quality.14 We assume that individu-
als with more income when well have higher utility if they
fall ill (uy > 0). We also assume that treatment makes the
12 Allowing income to affect the choice between public and private care
is  realistic (Besley et al.,  1999). It also simplifies the model since with a
population of identical individuals an  equilibrium with some individuals
choosing public and some choosing private care would require the repre-
sentative individual to  play a mixed strategy between public and private
care.
13 For  example, the average sickness insurance replacement rate in
Canada between 2000 and 2011 (for a  single 40 year old worker earning
the average production worker wage in manufacturing) was 36% and the
scheme covered 79% of the labour force. For other countries the replace-
ment rates and coverage were: 88% and 100% (France), 89% and 85%
(Germany), 100% and 100% (Norway), and 22% and 88% (Great Britain)
See Scruggs et al. (2017).
14 The utility functions are cardinal and unique up to the same linear
transformation. We discuss the  implications of multiple quality dimen-
sions in Appendix C. We  assume that patients can observe quality possibly
via advice from their primary care doctor or via public websites, such as
NHS  Choices in England or Helsedirektoratet in Norway, which publish
hospital quality indicators.
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Table  1
Main symbols and definitions.
 Probability of ill health
q,  s  Quality, capacity in public hospital
w; H(w; , s), H< 0,  Hs > 0  Waiting time; waiting time distribution function
y,  F(y), f  (y) Income per day when well, income cdf fn, density fn
yL(y) = y  − ℓ(y) +  r(ℓ(y)) yL: income when ill;  ℓ: lost earnings; r: compensation
u(y,  q, w) Realised utility when ill if treated in public hospital
u(y, q, , s) =
∫ ∞
0
u(y, q, w)dH Expected utility when ill if treated in public hospital
uN (y) Utility if not  ill
v(y, q, , s) = u +  (1 − )u
N
Expected utility if will choose public hospital if ill
e(q, s), z > 0, (z  = q, s)  Equilibrium mean daily demand for public hospital
v
e(y, q, s) = v(y, q, e(q, s), s) Expected utility if will choose public hospital if ill
v
o(y) Expected utility if will choose private hospital if ill
yˆ
e
(q, s) Threshold income: public hospital chosen if y ≤ yˆ
e
Be(q,  s) = B(q, e(q, s), s) Aggregate patient welfare
ce(q, s) =  c(q, e(q, s), s)  Expected cost of public hospital
cIe(q, s) = cI(q, e(q, s), s) Expected total earnings compensation
  Marginal deadweight cost of taxation
Be−(1 + )(c
e
+cIe) Welfare function
˛  ≥ 0 Public hospital altruism parameter
Rez= ˇB
e
z−c
Ie
z , (z  = q, s) Residual marginal welfare ignored by hospital
ˇ  = 1−˛(1+)
1+
patient better off than whilst ill and on the list  (U2 > U1),
so that uw = [U1 − U2]  < 0, and that  higher quality of care
increases post-discharge utility (U2q > 0), so that uq > 0.
15
The marginal rate of substitution between quality and wait-
ing time is
mrs(q, w; y)
def
=
∂w
∂q
|
du=0
= −
uq(y,  q, w)
uw(y, q, w)
.  (5)
Expected utility when ill for a  patient treated in  the
public hospital is the expectation of (4):
u(y, q, , s)
def
=
∫ ∞
0
u(y, q, w)dH(w; , s),
uy > 0, uq > 0, u <  0, us >  0. (6)
The first order stochastic dominance properties of the dis-
tribution of w with respect to   and s and the assumption
that uw < 0 imply that expected utility is decreasing in the
arrival rate  and increasing in capacity s.16
Utility when in  good health and not requiring hospi-
tal treatment uN(y) is an increasing function of income
and uN(y) > u(y, q, 0), so that even immediate treatment
does not make a  patient better off  than if healthy. Expected
utility for individuals who decide not to  take out supple-
mentary private health care insurance and to  be treated in
the public hospital when ill is
v(y, q, , s)
def
= u(y, q, ,  s) +  (1 − )uN(y), (7)
where vy > 0, v⋋ < 0, vz > 0 (z =  q, s).
15 Although patients may  distinguish between time spent on the waiting
list  and time spent in the hospital being treated (their length of stay),
allowing for this, and for quality to affect utility whilst in hospital as well
as  post treatment, would make no essential difference to  the results.
16 u(y, q, , s) is a  reduced form summary of the factors determining
expected utility when ill and treated in the public hospital. Patients care
about the distribution of waiting times (or, depending on u(y, q, w),  about
sufficient statistics of the distribution such as the mean wait). We  assume
that they observe this distribution, not  that they know  and s.
The private hospital provides a care package which, if it
had a zero price, would always be preferred to the public
hospital.17 Individuals who  know they will prefer to use
the private sector when ill buy full cover supplementary
private insurance at an actuarially fair  premium  . Their
utility when ill is  uo(y −  ) and when in  good health is
uN(y −  ). Expected utility from the outside option of tak-
ing out private insurance and being treated in the private
hospital when ill is
v
o(y)
def
= uo(y −  ) +  (1 − )uN(y −  ).
2.3. Rational expectations equilibrium
We  assume that  private health care  is  a normal good in
that there is a threshold income level (ymin, ymax) defined
by
v(yˆ, q, ,  s) −  vo(yˆ) =  0, (8)
with yˆq > 0, yˆ < 0, yˆs > 0.
All individuals with y  ≤ yˆ choose not to have private insur-
ance and to be treated in the public hospital when ill.
Since individuals fall ill at the rate  and when ill a pro-
portion F(yˆ(q, , s)) demand care in the public sector, the
expected demand (arrival rate)  at the public hospital
17 To keep the analysis tractable we assume that private hospital deci-
sions on  the premium, quality, and waiting time are not affected by
decisions in the public hospital. As Grassi and Ma  (2011) and Laine and Ma
(2017) illustrate, even in a  context with no rationing by waiting, models
of  the  interactions between public and private providers can  be complex
and  generate multiple types of equilibria.
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is F(yˆ(q, , s)). Hence the equilibrium expected demand
e(q, s)18 is implicitly defined by
e − F(yˆ(q, e,  s)) = 0.
This embodies the rational expectations assumption: the
arrival rate in (8) upon which patients’ decision about join-
ing the waiting list for the public hospital are based is  the
arrival rate to which their decisions give rise. Expected
demand is increasing in  hospital quality and capacity since
both increase the utility of the marginal patient:
ez(q, s) =
f (yˆ)yˆz
1 − f (yˆ)yˆ
> 0, (z = q, s) . (9)
In equilibrium, the distribution function for waiting
time is
He(w;  q, s)
def
=H(w; e(q, s), s). (10)
From (1) and (9) an increase in  q produces a  stochasti-
cally dominating shift in He(w; q, s)  : Heq = H
e
q < 0. We
assume that the positive direct effect of a  capacity expan-
sion exceeds the negative induced demand effect, thereby
producing a first order stochastically dominated shift
in the equilibrium waiting time distribution: Hes = Hs +
H
e
s > 0. Hence, substituting 
e(q, s) in (2), the equi-
librium expected time  on the waiting list is  we(q, s) =
w(e(q, s), s) increases with quality (weq = w
e
q > 0) and
falls with capacity (wes = w
e
s + ws <  0).
Using He(w; q,  s) in (6),  and hence in  (7), the equilib-
rium expected utility for individuals who will use the public
sector when ill is19
v
e(y, q, s)
def
= v(y, q, e(q, s), s). (11)
Our assumption that an increase in  s produces a leftward
shift in the equilibrium waiting time distribution implies
that ves > 0. We  also make the plausible assumption that the
positive direct effect of q on expected utility is bigger than
the negative indirect effect via  the induced rightward shift
in waiting time distribution, so that an increase in quality
increases equilibrium expected utility: veq > 0.
The effect of hospital decisions about q and s on indi-
viduals varies with their income. An increase in capacity s
will make all public patients better off since it induces a pre-
ferred distribution of waiting times and has no direct effect
on utility. However, it is possible that an increase in  qual-
ity q will make infra-marginal patients with y  < yˆ worse
18 We  use superscript e to  indicate equilibrium values of variables and
functions.
19 We  assume that patients observe quality but not that they observe s.
v
e(y, q, s)  is a  reduced form showing the dependence of expected utility at
the REE on y, q and s.  The reduced form is  derived from the more primitive
utility u(y, q, w) from public hospital treatment (4), the distribution func-
tion of waiting times H(w; , s),  which together give expected utility (6)
when treated in the public hospital when ill,  the probability of falling ill,
and the REE expected demand e(q, s). We assume that patients observe
the  equilibrium waiting time distribution He(w; q, s) = H(w; e(q,  s), s).
Or,  if their primitive preferences u(y, q, w) imply that they only care about
some sufficient statistics of the distribution, as in Section 2.4 where they
care only about the mean wait, we assume that they observe these suffi-
cient statistics.
off if the utility loss from a  worse waiting time distribution
caused by the increase in demand is greater than the direct
effect of quality on utility. But the marginal patient with
income yˆ  must have  been made better off by an increase in
quality since otherwise demand would not have increased
and demand can only increase if the marginal patient is
made better off choosing the public hospital.20
A patient’s marginal rate of substitution of quality for
capacity at the equilibrium distribution of w is
MRSe(q, s; y)
def
= −
∂s
∂q
∣∣∣∣
dve=0
=
v
e
q(y, q, s)
v
e
s (y, q, s)
, (12)
and in  general the MRSe varies with patient income. Since
hospital decisions shift the distribution of waiting times
facing patients and determine the quality they experience
once in  hospital, MRSe plays an important role in  determin-
ing the optimal payment regime.
Note that  mrs(q, w;  y) in  (5) is  the rate at which a  patient
is willing to trade off realised ex post waiting time for qual-
ity whereas MRSe(q, s; y)  in (12) is the rate at which they
are willing to  trade off the ex ante distribution of waiting
times for quality.
The equilibrium critical income level yˆ
e
that divides
individuals into those who are treated in  the public hos-
pital and those who  take out supplementary health care
insurance and are treated in  the private sector is defined
(see (8)) by v(yˆ, q, e(q, s)) =  vo(yˆ) as
yˆ
e
(q,  s)  = yˆ(q,  e(q, s), s). (13)
Any changes in  q and s that leave critical income
and thus the expected utility of the marginal public
patient unchanged will also leave demand unchanged (see
Appendix A):
−
∂s
∂q
|
dve(yˆ
e
,q,s)=0
=
v
e
q(yˆ
e
, q, s)
v
e
s (yˆ
e
, q, s)
=
yˆ
e
q
yˆ
e
s
=
eq
es
=  −
∂s
∂q
|
de=0
(14)
Thus the MRSe(q, s; yˆ
e
) of the marginal public sector
patient, but not  necessarily the MRSe(q, s; y)  of infra-
marginal patients with y < yˆ
e
,  is revealed by the marginal
demand responses to  quality and capacity.
2.4. A simple special case
We  can illustrate the derivation of the rational expec-
tations equilibrium with an instructive special case with
simple preferences and queueing mechanism. Assume that
the period utility functions in  (4) are U1 = a(y)b1 and U2 =
a(y)b2(q), individuals have finite lifetime of T , the discount
factor ı is constant, and that income is not affected by ill-
ness. Then realised utility when ill for an individual who  is
treated in the public hospital is u(y, q, w)  = a(y){b2(q)T −
[b2(q) − b1]w}ı and expected utility (7) for an individual
20 See  Appendix C for a more formal argument.
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Fig. 1. Derivation of the rational expectation equilibrium. v(y, q, w): expected utility from public hospital. vo(y): expected utility from private hospital. 1/s:
expected length of  stay in public hospital.  expected arrival rate at  public hospital. F(y): income distribution function (minimum income normalized to
zero:  ymin = 0). yˆ critical income at  which v(y, q, w) = v
o(y).
who decides to  be treated in the public hospital if they fall
ill is linear in the expected wait w:
v(y, q, w¯) = a(y){b2(q)T −  [b2(q) − b1]w}ı  + (1 −  )uN(y).
Assume also that the length of stay when admitted
to hospital is negatively exponentially distributed with
parameter s, so that the average length of stay in  hospital
is  1/s, and that the hospital has a  single bed. Patients fall ill
and join the waiting list according to a  Poisson process with
average arrival rate . These assumptions define the sim-
plest system in queueing theory which has a  steady state
in which the waiting time w  from falling ill to completion
of  treatment has a  negative exponential distribution with
expectation w = 1
s−
(Taylor and Karlin, 1998,  p 551).
In Panel I  of  Fig. 1,  the bold upward sloping line shows,
for a given service rate s, the relationship between the
expected wait w and the average arrival rate for treat-
ment . As  approaches the capacity of the system (s), the
expected waiting time tends to infinity.
We next derive the demand curve. Panel II of the figure
maps the expected waiting time into an expected util-
ity v(0, q, w) for individuals with the lowest income level
which for convenience we normalise to  zero (ymin =  0).
Panel III then maps the income level to  the expected utility
v(y, q, w) if public treatment is  chosen and to expected util-
ity v(y, qo, wo) when the private hospital is chosen. These
two curves intersect at the critical income yˆ(q, w)  where
public and private hospital yield the same expected util-
ity. Finally, Panel IV  maps the critical income level into the
number of individuals F(yˆ)  who choose public treatment.
This is the expected arrival rate
(
 =  F(yˆ)
)
for the public
hospital, which then maps into an expected waiting time
w = 1
s−
in Panel I.
The demand curve for public treatment is derived as fol-
lows. Consider an anticipated expected wait w1. This maps
into a critical income level yˆ1 in Panel III which in  Panel IV
yields the arrival rate rate 1. Thus (1, w1) is  a point on
the demand curve in Panel I. But it is not an equilibrium
since the low referral rate 1 results in an expected wait
1
s−1
< w1. Similarly (3,  w3) is also on the demand sched-
ule in Panel I  and is also not  an equilibrium since the high
arrival rate 3 would yield an expected wait of
1
s−3
>  w3.
Given the public hospital decisions on the parameters (q,  s)
of the M/M/1  queueing model, the unique equilibrium
is  given by
(
e, we
)
= (2,  w2). When citizens anticipate
an expected wait w2 at the public hospital their choices
between public and private treatment yield an arrival rate
at the public hospital which results in the expected waiting
time they anticipated: 1
s−2
= w2.  The rational expectations
equilibrium at given quality and capacity is  at the inter-
section of the downward sloping demand curve and the
upward sloping expected waiting time curve w.
Now consider the effects of changes in  the public hos-
pital decisions on s  and q. An increase in  the hospital
service rate s  shifts the upward sloping w = 1/(s − )  to
the right and so results in higher equilibrium demand
e(q, s) and lower equilibrium expected waiting time
we(q, s).
An reduction in  q shifts the straight line in Panel II
plotting v(0,  q,  w) against w  to the right and makes it
steeper in (w, v)-space.21 In Panel III the three functions
v( · , q, wi)  (i  =  1, 2, 3) plotting expected utility from the
21 Our assumptions imply ∂v(0,  q, w)/∂q = a(0)b2q(q)(T − w) > 0, and
∂
2
v(0,  q, w)/∂q∂w = −a(0)b2q(q) < 0. Hence the line v(0,  q, w) becomes
flatter in (v, w)-space (steeper in (w, v)-space).
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public hospital against income at different expected wait-
ing times but with the same quality will also shift to  the
right. Their intersections with the curve for expected utility
from private treatment v( ·  , qo,  wo) will be pushed further
up that curve, thereby reducing the critical incomes yˆi given
w and thus reducing i = F(yˆi). Hence the quality reduc-
tion shifts the demand curve in  Panel I to  the left, resulting
in a lower equilibrium demand e(q, s) and a  shorter equi-
librium expected wait we(q, s).22
In this simple specification of preferences the expected
wait is a sufficient statistic for the entire waiting time  dis-
tribution as far as patients are concerned and could be
interpreted as a  price for public treatment. The assump-
tion that income is unaffected by illness (either because
of full insurance or because illness does not affect pro-
ductivity) implies that income is  not affected by hospital
decisions and simplifies the identification of the critical
income earner. The graphical representation of the rational
expectations equilibrium would be much more compli-
cated, or impossible, without these assumptions. However,
as we will show in  Section 3.4,  both assumptions have very
strong implications for the optimal financing rules for the
public hospital. In what follows we  therefore revert to  the
more general assumptions about preferences and the effect
of waiting on income.
2.5. Welfare
2.5.1. Individual welfare
To focus on the implications of rationing by  waiting
we assume that the welfare function is  individualistic and
respects patient preferences. Total individual welfare is23
Be(q, s) =
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
v
e(y, q, s)dF(y) +
∫ ymax
yˆ
e
(q,s)
v
o(y)dF(y),
22 We  can use Panel I to contrast the stochastic waiting time model with
the  equilibrium in a deterministic waiting time model in which demand
and supply and hence waiting time w are  certain. With the same prefer-
ences the demand curve, now plotting demand against the certain wait,
is unchanged. In  the stochastic model we can interpret 1/s as the aver-
age length of stay (days per  patient). In the deterministic model we  can
interpret s as the certain supply (patients per day) and the equilibrium
waiting time is determined by the equality of certain supply and cer-
tain  demand: s = (q, w). In Panel I the certain equilibrium waiting time
would be determined by the intersection of the demand curve and a  ver-
tical  supply curve at s. A reduction in quality would shift the demand
curve downward, reducing the certain waiting time. But, since supply is
not  changed neither is the number of patients treated. Thus in the  deter-
ministic waiting time model, if q and w are positive, a  reduction in quality
will push the equilibrium down the vertical supply curve. This will reduce
costs  but leave revenue unchanged, thereby increasing profit. Hence there
cannot be an equilibrium with positive quality and waiting time in a  deter-
ministic waiting time model unless the provider had an  altruistic concern
for quality.
23 In Fig. 1,  given the strong assumptions about preferences and income,
and  assuming a uniform income distribution, the  total welfare of those
using  the public hospital is  the area in quadrant III between the curve
v(y, q, w
e
) = v(y, q, w2)  and the income axis up to yˆ
e
= yˆ2 . The welfare of
those chosing the private hospital is  area between the curve vo(y, qo,  w
o
)
and the income axis for y  > yˆ
e
= yˆ2 .
Since patients with income yˆ
e
(q, s) are indifferent between
public and private hospital care
Bez(q, s) =
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
v
e
z(y, q, s)dF(y) + f (yˆ
e
)[ve(yˆ
e
,  q, s) − vo(yˆ
e
)]
=
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
v
e
z(y, q, s)dF(y), (z  = q, s).
Some of the expressions for optimal payments in  Sec-
tion 3 involve the change in  aggregate patient welfare from
a change in  quality when demand is held constant by a
reduction in capacity (i.e., when the change in  quality is
accompanied by a  change in capacity ds  = −(eq/
e
s )dq):
dBe
dq
|
de=0
= Beq − B
e
s
eq
es
=
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
v
e
s (y, q,  s)[
v
e
q(y, q, s)
v
e
s (y, q, s)
−
eq(q, s)
es (q, s)
]dF(y)
=
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
v
e
s (y, q, s)[
v
e
q(y, q, s)
v
e
s (y, q, s)
−
v
e
q(yˆ
e
,  q, s)
v
e
s (yˆ
e
, q, s)
]dF(y),
where the last step uses (14).  This expression is posi-
tive, negative or  zero as MRSe(q, s; y) = veq(y, q,  s)/v
e
s (y, q, s)
decreases, increases, or is  unaffected by income. In
Appendix B we prove
Proposition 1. (i)  The marginal rate of substitution between
quality and capacity MRSe(q, s; y)(12) is independent of pre-
illness income y  if  and only if the marginal rate of substitution
between quality and waiting time mrs(q, w; y)(5) is indepen-
dent of income. (ii)  mrs(q, w; y) is independent of income
if and only if  (a) utility per day when waiting and utility
per day post treatment can be written as  U1 =  a(y1)b1 and
U2 =  a(y2)b2(q), and (b) income is not affected by treatment:
y1 = y2.
We  can interpret b1 and b2 as functions of health status
whilst waiting for treatment and post treatment. Condition
(a) is  a  condition on preferences: multiplicative separabil-
ity between income and health status.24 Condition (b) is
a condition on income. Since we have assumed that there
is no loss of earnings post treatment condition (b) requires
either that there is no loss of earnings whilst on the waiting
list, ℓ(y) = 0, or  that the insurance scheme fully compen-
sates all lost earnings, r(ℓ(y)) ≡ ℓ(y). Given (a) and (b), the
utility of income can be factored out from uq and uw ,  so
that mrs(q, w; y) is  independent of income. Conditions (a)
and (b) also imply that utility of income can be factored out
from veq and from v
e
s so that MRS
e(q, s; y) is  also independent
of income.
24 Additive separability would also ensure that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution did  not vary with income but would imply that all individuals
would  make the same choice of public or private treatment. Hence we
require multiplicative separability in Proposition 1 so that individuals dif-
fer  in some parameter which affects utility from treatment but not the
marginal rate of substitution between q  and s.
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Patient decisions on whether to take out private health
insurance and be treated in the private sector when ill or to
avoid paying for private health insurance and to be treated
in the public hospital when ill are made ex ante: on the
basis of their beliefs about the equilibrium distribution of
public hospital waiting times He(w;  q, s). It is expected util-
ity in equilibrium ve(y, q, s), not realised utility v(y, q, w)  on
joining the waiting list, which is part of the welfare function
used to evaluate alternative hospital payment schemes. But
patient preferences over quality q and the realised waiting
time w (u(y, q, w)  (4)) determine their preferences over
quality and the equilibrium distribution of waiting time
(ve(y,  q, s) (11)).
2.5.2. Costs
Treatment cost.  In equilibrium the public hospital’s
expected output is  equal to  expected demand (e)  from
patients. The hospital’s expected cost is  c(q, , s). Increas-
ing quality is costly (cq >  0) as are increases in capacity
(cs > 0). Expected hospital cost also increase with the
expected number of patients treated (c > 0), for exam-
ple because each patient treated requires drugs and other
consumables.25 In  equilibrium, expected cost is
ce(q, s) = c(q, e(q, s), s),
with cez = cz + cz > 0,  (z  =  q,  s). We  ignore, until Section
4.2,  the possibility that expected hospital cost also depends
on cost reducing effort.
Insurance cost Patients who lose earnings whilst waiting
receive compensation (3) from the public insurance fund.
The expected public sector payment to an ill individual with
income y when well who is  treated in  the public hospi-
tal and has an expected waiting time  of we(q, s)  days is
we(q, s)r(ℓ(y)). The scheme also compensates individuals
who choose to be  treated privately and who have a  total
time (exogenous and short) from becoming ill to discharge
of wo < we. The expected total payment from the earnings
insurance fund is26
cIe(q, s) = w
e
(q, s)
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
r(ℓ(y))dF(y) + wo
∫ ymax
yˆ
e
(q,s)
r(ℓ(y))dF(y).
25 We  assume that the expectation of the cost w.r.t. the number of
patients treated can be expressed as the cost of the expected number of
patients. Letting n be the random number of patients treated, this requires
that the cost function is of the form c1(n)c2(q, s), and that either c1(n)  is
linear in n or that c1(n) is  a polynomial in n and the arrival rate of patients,
and therefore the output rate, follows a Poisson process.
26 There is some debate in the economic evaluation literature about
whether the costs of lost earnings should be measured by the human capi-
tal (Weisbrod, 1961) or friction cost methods (Koopmanschap et al., 1995)
but there is agreement that they should be taken into account (Drummond
et  al., 2015). We  avoid the double counting problem (Pritchard and
Sculpher, 2000) by separating out the cost imposed on  the public sector
via the insurance of lost earnings and the utility cost of uncompensated
lost earnings imposed on  the  patient. An example of public concerns about
the  social insurance costs of long waiting list  is  the motivation behind the
Faster Return to Work scheme in Norway (see Aakvik et al. (2015)). Note
that if the cost of lost production whilst waiting for treatment fell on pri-
vate sector firms, rather than on workers, the welfare function should still
include cIe , though not scaled up by  the marginal welfare cost of taxation
,  as in (17) below.
An  increase in q or  s  alters expected insurance cost by
changing the expected time to completion of treatment
for public patients and by changing the expected number
treated in the public sector27 :
cIez = w
e
z
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
r(ℓ(y))dF(y)
+[we(q, s)  −  wo]r(ℓ(yˆ
e
(q, s)))ez,  (z =  q,  s).
(15)
The first rhs term is the waiting time effect and the second is
the waiting list effect. The waiting list effect is positive on the
plausible assumption that expected total time to  discharge
is greater in the public hospital than in  the private hospi-
tal. Since an increase in quality increases the waiting time
(weq = w
e
q > 0) the waiting time effect is  also positive for
quality increases and so cIeq > 0. But notice that because w
e
s
< 0 the sign of cIes is ambiguous: capacity increases have
a positive waiting list effect but a negative waiting time
effect. However, if  an increase in s is accompanied by a
reduction in q to keep e(q, s)  constant, the waiting list
effects are zero since there is no change in demand. Then
the effect on the mean wait is ws + w(
e
s + 
e
q
(
−es/
e
q
)
) =
ws < 0 and we get (see Appendix C)
dcIe
ds
∣∣∣∣
de=0
= ws
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
r(ℓ(y)dF(y)
=
(
dcIe
dq
∣∣∣∣
d=0
)  (
−
eq
es
)
< 0. (16)
Thus increasing s  and simultaneously reducing q to  keep
demand constant reduces expected insurance cost and con-
versely increasing q and reducing s increases expected
insurance cost.
3. Optimal payment schemes
3.1. First best quality and capacity
The regulator’s welfare function is28
Ae(q, s)
def
= Be(q, s)  −
(
1 + 
)  [
ce(q, s) + cIe(q, s)
]
. (17)
27 Using (9) and (13), it can  be shown that ez =  f (yˆ
e
)yˆ
e
z . See Appendix
A.
28 One set of assumptions which yields this form is that the regulator
is  only concerned with patient welfare and tax financed public expen-
diture, and sets a  lump sum tax or subsidy so that the provider just
breaks even financially after any incentive payments. Or we can assume
that welfare is  the sum of patient benefit and the hospital utility and
the  lump sum tax or subsidy drives hospital utility to zero. We  ignore
here the implications of the regulator being unable to impose lump sum
taxes  or subsidies. In analyses available on request we show that a  hos-
pital breakeven constraint would then imply that the optimal prices also
depend on  inverse demand elasticities, as in Boiteux (1956).  If hospital
managerial effort affected quality or the monetary cost of production and
had a  non-monetary cost this should be reflected in the hospital objective
function and the welfare function and would affect the precise form of the
optimal incentive scheme. But it would not  affect  the basic message of our
simpler specification that achieving the first best when there is rationing
by  waiting requires an additional policy instrument. We briefly consider
the implication of cost reducing effort in Section 4.2.
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where  is the marginal cost of public funds. Ignoring corner
solutions, first best29 quality and capacity levels satisfy the
first order conditions
Aez = B
e
z − (1 + )c
e
z − (1 + )c
Ie
z = 0, (z = s, q). (18)
The first best can be achieved if the regulator has as
many policy instruments with linearly independent effects
on hospital decisions as the hospital has decision variables.
The hospital takes decisions on q and s  which result in
an expected number of treatments, e(q, s). We  assume
that it is always possible to observe output and so to set
a prospective price p.
30 In Section 3.2 we derive first best
payment schemes in which a  prospective price per patient
treated p is combined with price pm attached to another
observable performance measure m(q,  s)  affected by hos-
pital decisions. In Section 3.3 we consider multiple quality
and capacity dimensions and the implications of patients
being concerned only about the average waiting time.
In Section 3.4 we consider the restrictive assumptions
under which the first best can be achieved when only out-
put is observable so that the prospective price is the only
policy instrument. In Section 4.1 we derive the second best
prospective price when the restrictive assumptions set out
in Section 3.4 are  not satisfied. In Section 4.2  we then allow
for the possibility that unobservable hospital effort affects
cost and consider a  cost reimbursement rule combined
with a prospective output price.
3.2. First best prospective price and performance
payment
Suppose the risk neutral public hospital receives a  pay-
ment per patient treated, p and a payment pm per  unit
of some other observable measure of activity m(q, s) that
depends monotonically on the hospital’s decisions on qual-
ity and capacity. It  also receives a  lump sum transfer ϒ to
ensure that it breaks even.31
Examples of measures of performance are (i) m = s (e.g.,
a price per bed), (ii) m = q (a P4P quality incentive scheme),
(iii) m = we(q, s)  (a price, possibly negative, on expected
waiting time), and (iv) m = cIe (the hospital bears a  pro-
portion of the sickness leave insurance cost). In general, any
measure m(q, s)  will do as long as it is observable and its
gradient is linearly independent of the gradient of e(q, s).
We discuss examples (i) and (ii) later  in this section,
while examples (iii) and (iv) are examined in Appendix D.
As in Ellis and McGuire (1990),  the hospital is assumed
to be risk neutral and to maximise a  weighted sum of
expected profit and patient welfare, with the weight  ˛ ≥ 0
reflecting its concern for patient welfare. Allowing for such
concerns is common in models of hospital behaviour and,
29 Strictly speaking, the term “first best” is  a  misnomer since we ignore
the  externality that arises because each patient does not take account
of  the effect of her decision to join the  waiting list on the waiting times
of  other patients. See Naor (1969),  Littlechild (1974), and Edelson and
Hildebrand (1975) on  policies to control decisions to  join  the queue.
30 With a risk neutral hospital a prospective price per patient treated is
equivalent to payment for the expected number of treatments.
31 With the presence of substantial fixed costs, this transfer will be pos-
itive.
whilst he  degree of altruism affects the magnitudes of pay-
ments related to the hospital’s decisions, it does not affect
their essential structure. The hospital solves
max
q,s
p(q, s) +  pmm(q,  s)  − c
e(q, s) +  ˛Be(q, s)  + ,
and first order conditions for an interior solution are
pq +  pmmq + ˛B
e
q = c
e
q,
ps + pmms +  ˛B
e
s = c
e
s .
When choosing q  and s the hospital takes into account
marginal cost cez and a fraction  ˛ of marginal patient benefit
Bez . But the hospital ignores the remaining fraction (1 −  ˛)
of Bez , all of the marginal cost of insuring lost earnings c
Ie
z ,
and the fact that public funds have a  marginal cost of .
Define the residual marginal social benefit (RMSB) of hospital
decision z as
Rez
def
=ˇBez − c
Ie
z ,  ˇ
def
=
1 − ˛(1 +  )
1 + 
. (19)
Rez is that part of the marginal welfare effect of decision z
which is  not internalised by the hospital.
To achieve the first best the regulator sets prices pFB

and
pFBm so that the hospital marginal revenues from decisions
on q  and s equal their RMSBs:
pFB 
e
q + p
FB
mmq = R
e
q, (20)
pFB s + p
FB
mms = R
e
s . (21)
The hospital will then take full account of the marginal
social benefits and costs choosing q and s to  satisfy
pFB

q + pFBmmq + ˛B
e
q − c
e
q = (ˇB
e
q − c
Ie
q )  + ˛B
e
q −  c
e
q
=
Beq
(1 + )
−  ceq − c
Ie
q = 0,
pFB

s + pFBmms + ˛B
e
s − c
e
s = (ˇB
e
s − c
Ie
s )  + ˛B
e
s − c
e
s
=
Bes
(1 + )
− ces − c
Ie
s = 0,
so that (18) holds. Solving (20) and (21) for pFB

and pFBm gives
Proposition 2. The first best prices per treated patient and
for the performance measure m(q, s) are
pFB =
Reqms − R
e
smq
eqms −  
e
smq
=
Req −  R
e
s
mq
ms
eq − 
e
s
mq
ms
, (22)
pFBm =
Res
e
q − R
e
s
e
s
eqms −  
e
smq
=
Res − R
e
q
es
eq
ms − mq
es
eq
, (23)
where all terms are evaluated at the first best q and s.
The output price (22) is  set so that marginal revenue
(pFB

(eq − 
e
s
mq
ms
)) from increasing quality when capacity is
adjusted to keep the performance measure m(q, s) constant
is equal to  the marginal residual social benefit of quality
(Req − R
e
s
mq
ms
)) when s  adjusted to keep m(q, s)  constant.32
32 If ms → 0, as in Example (2) below, L’Hospital’s rule gives pFB =
Re
s
e
s
.
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Likewise, pFBm is set equal to the marginal residual social
benefit of capacity per unit of measure m by raising capac-
ity when quality is adjusted to keep demand e(q, s)constant.
Intuitively, p and pm incentivise different margins and
their optimal levels are contingent on the other margin
being kept at its optimal level.
We now consider two specific examples of first best
payment regimes. The first combines the prospective out-
put price with a price ps on capacity s. If hospital capacity
only depends on the number of beds, then a price per bed,
together with a  price per patient treated can support the
first-best allocation. Since ms = 1 and mq = 0,  Proposition
2 implies
Example 1. The first best prices on treated patients and
capacity s are
pFB1

=
Req
eq
=
ˇBeq
eq
−
cIeq
eq
, (24)
pFB1s = R
e
s − R
e
q
es
eq
= ˇ
(
Bes − B
e
q
es
eq
)
−
(
cIes − c
Ie
q
es
eq
)
(25)
= ˇ
(
Bes − B
e
q
es
eq
)
−  ws
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
r(ℓ(y))dF(y), (26)
where all terms are evaluated at the first best q and s.
The prospective output price (24) reflects the fact that
rewarding output incentivises quality. The first best out-
put price pFB1

is less than the marginal social benefit per
patient attracted by higher quality
(
Beq/
e
q
)
to the extent
that (i) hospitals are intrinsically motivated and raising
public funds is costly (which imply ˇ  < 1), and (ii) a  quality
increase results in  greater compensation for lost earnings
because it attracts more patients to public treatment if ill
and therefore increases the waiting time and the waiting
list. To bring this out starkly, suppose that the provider
is not altruistic (˛  = 0) and that there is  no loss of earn-
ings whilst waiting for treatment, or no compensation for
loss of earnings, so that cIe = 0. Then (24) can be written as
pFB

eq =  B
e
q/
(
1 + 
)
,  so that the public hospitals’ marginal
revenue from increasing quality should be less than the
marginal patient welfare from higher quality only because
of the marginal cost of public funds.
The optimal reward for capacity (pFB1s ) is less than its
RMSB (Res )  because the prospective payment for patients
treated already provides some incentive to increase capac-
ity in order to  shift the distribution of waiting times to
the left.33 Since demand is controlled through the effect
of p on choice of quality, the optimal marginal reward for
capacity (26) ensures the optimal mix  between q and s  with
demand held constant. As we  noted in  Section 2.5.1, if the
marginal rate of substitution between quality and capacity
is  the same at all income levels, then Bes = B
e
q
es
eq
and pFB1s is
solely determined by  the effect of capacity on the expected
cost of sickness insurance when quality is adjusted to hold
demand constant. With demand constant cIe is  reduced by
33 Notice that in (25) we can use (24) to  get pFB1s =  R
e
s − p
FB1

es .
an increase in capacity (see (16)) since it reduces the mean
waiting time. Hence capacity should be  subsidised.
In many systems pay for performance (P4P) schemes
link payments to hospital quality. For example, in the
English NHS hospitals are paid higher prices for some treat-
ments if they follow stipulated best practice guidelines and
are financially penalised if too many of their patients have
an emergency readmission within 30 days of discharge
(Meacock et al., 2014; Kristensen et al., 2013). In our set-
ting, a  price attached to  quality implies ms = 0 and mq = 1
and we  obtain
Example 2. The first best prices per patient and for quality
are
pFB2 =
Res
es
= ˇ
Bes
es
−
cIes
es
, (27)
pFB2q = R
e
q − R
e
s
eq
es
=  ˇ
(
Beq − B
e
s
eq
es
)
+
eq
es
ws
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
r(ℓ(y))dF(y), (28)
where all terms are evaluated at the first best q and s.
Since s is not  directly rewarded, it is incentivised by the
price per treated patient attracted by the fact that higher s
results in  a  more favourable distribution of waiting times
(27). The marginal reward for quality (28) is less than its
RMSB Req because quality is also indirectly incentivised
through the prospective output price. The quality reward
is  thus given by the demand constant RMSB of quality.
If all patients have the same marginal rate of substi-
tution of quality for capacity, the responses of demand to
quality and capacity would transmit the correct signal to
the hospital about patient preferences. The first term on
the right hand side of (28) would be zero and the only rea-
son for wishing to change quality is  because it also affects
the expected waiting time and hence the cost of provid-
ing insurance against lost earnings. At constant demand
(and thus constant waiting list), the reduction in capacity
required to keep demand constant when quality increases
results in a  longer waiting time (−ws
eq
es
> 0) and higher
insurance costs. Thus a  penalty on quality is required to
correct for the implicit over-rewarding of quality through
p. This is a  stark illustration of how allowing for the costs
imposed by rationing by waiting affects the form of the
optimal payment scheme.
These two  examples of first best payment regimes com-
bine a prospective price with a reward directly targeted
either q or s. As we show in  Appendix D it is also possi-
ble to achieve the first best by combining the prospective
price with a  price on measures such as the average waiting
time we(q,  s), or social insurance costs cIe(q, s), which are
functions of both decision variables.
3.3. Multiple quality and supply decisions
As we  show in  Appendix F.1, our results also hold when
there are multiple quality (nq > 1) and capacity (ns > 1)
dimensions. Achieving the first best will in general require
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an output price plus nq + ns − 1 prices attached to nq + ns −
1 performance measures which are linearly independent
and have at least one of the measures affected by each of
nq + ns − 1 quality and capacity decisions.
The variety of pay for performance schemes which
incentivise different aspects of quality (Jha et al., 2012;
Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016; Sutton et al., 2012) sug-
gests that finding sufficient performance measures related
to quality decisions may  not  be a problem. But the distri-
bution of waiting times may  depend on hard to observe
factors such as efforts to reduce patient non-attendance at
clinics, the extent of coordination between different hospi-
tal specialities, and hospital liaison with local social service
departments to reduce bed-blocking by patients who are
medically fit for discharge.
However, the required set of first best prices is drasti-
cally reduced if patients care only about quality and the
mean waiting time.34 In Appendix E  we prove
Proposition 3. If patients care only about the mean wait
we(q1, . . .,  qnq , s1, .  . ., sns ) then the first best can be achieved
(a) with an output price, prices attached to nq − 1 quality
dimensions, and a price attached to the mean waiting time or
(b) with an output price and nq prices on the quality dimen-
sions.
The intuition is  straightforward. Although the distribu-
tion of waiting times depends on all the quality and supply
dimensions, at given quality the mean waiting time is a  suf-
ficient statistic for the waiting time distribution and the ns
decisions affecting it. Thus there are only nq + 1 hospital
characteristics which affect patient welfare and so only nq
prices are required in addition to  the output price.
3.4. First best with only a prospective output price?
We now return to the world in which quality and capac-
ity each have a  single dimension in  order to examine the
circumstances in which the first best can be  achieved using
only the prospective output price. Thus it is not possible to
observe q or s or any performance measure m(q, s) affected
by them. Proposition 2 implies that the first best can then
be achieved using just the prospective output price pFB

only
if  the first best price pFBm on a  performance measure m(q, s)
is zero. Inspection of the numerator of (23) shows that this
requires (see (25) and (26))
Res − R
e
q
es
eq
= ˇ
(
Bes − B
e
q
es
eq
)
−  ws
∫ yˆe(q,s)
ymin
r(ℓ(y))dF(y) = 0. (29)
From Proposition 1 the first term is  zero if and only if the
marginal rate of substitution MRSe(q, s; y)  between qand
s is independent of income. As we showed this requires
(a) that income is  multiplicatively separable from quality
and waiting time and (b) there is  no loss of income whilst
34 We  show in Appendix F.2 that this requires that u(y, q, w) (4)  is  linear
in w.
waiting. Since the second term in (29) is  zero if and only
if there is no sickness insurance against lost earnings, this
combined with (b) implies that treatment must not affect
earnings. Hence, we have
Proposition 4. The first best allocation is achievable using
only a prospective output price if and only if  (a) quality and
waiting time are multiplicatively separable from income in
patient preferences and (b)  treatment does not affect earnings
(ℓ(y) ≡ 0).
We can illustrate the proposition diagrammatically in
Fig. 2 since the conditions stated in  Proposition 3 satisfy the
assumptions required to provide the simple illustration of
the rational expectations equilibrium in Fig. 1.
Suppose that the hospital initially faces the first best
price pFB

defined in  Proposition 2 and there are  no other
financial incentives. The hospital chooses q1 and s1 which
result in the rational expectations equilibrium in Panel I
in which the equilibrium expected wait is w1 = w
e(q1, s1)
days and the equilibrium demand is e(q1, s1). Consider the
introduction of a small reward ps > 0 for capacity accom-
panied by a  small reduction in p

which lead the hospital to
increase capacity (ds  > 0) but to reduce quality (dq  < 0), so
that the equilibrium demand (and hence expected number
of patients treated) does not change (dq  = −
es
eq
ds < 0).
The effect of dq < 0 is  to shift the v(ymin,  q, w1) line
in Panel II  to the right and to make it steeper in (w, v)
space. The utility function v( ·  , q, w1) in  Panel III shifts to
the right from v(  · , q1,  w1) to v(  · , q2,  w1) and the critical
income falls to yˆ(q2,  w1). The reduction in quality shifts
the demand curve in  Panel I down at all expected wait-
ing times. But, by construction, the increase in  capacity
from s1 to s2 shifts the expected waiting time function w  =
1/(s − ) downward so that the expected waiting time falls
and equilibrium demand is unchanged: e(q1, w
e(q1, s1)) =
e(q2, w
e(q2, s2)).
In Panel III the reduction in w to w2 shifts the
v( ·  , q2,  w) curve back to the left, offsetting the
reduction in quality, so that the critical income (and
so demand) is  unchanged: yˆ(q1, w1) = yˆ(q2, w2).
The expected utility of the marginal public hospi-
tal patient with this critical income is  unchanged:
v(yˆ,  q1,  w1) =  v(yˆ,  q2,  w2) = v(yˆ, q1+dq, w1+dw)  which
implies that the marginal rate of substitution of the
marginal patient is  −vq(yˆ,  q, w2)/vw(yˆ, q, w2).  But the
assumption (a) on preferences and patient income in
Proposition 3 means that, from Proposition 1, the marginal
rate of substitution between quality and waiting time is
the same at all income levels. Hence the changes dq,dw
which hold the expected utility of the marginal patient
unchanged also do not change the expected utility of
infra-marginal patients. Thus reducing the prospective
price below its first best level and introducing a  capacity
incentive does not change the expected utility of any
patient.
The other reason for introducing a capacity incentive is
to change the expected cost of insuring individuals against
loss of income whilst waiting for treatment because this
is ignored by the partially altruistic public hospital. The
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Fig. 2. Effect of (dq  < 0, ds  > 0) which keep equilibrium expected demand e(q, s) constant. Initial equilibrium at  q1 , s1 has expected waiting time w1 =
w
e
(q1 , s1), equilibrium expected demand e(q1, s1). New equilibrium at q2 = q1 + dq < q1 ,  s2 = s1 + ds  > s1 has expected waiting time w2 = w
e
(q2,  s2)  <
w1 = w
e
(q1, s1), equilibrium expected demand e(q2,  s2) = e(q1,  s1). v(y, q, w) and vo(y) are expected utility for individuals who chose the public hospital
and  the outside option of private treatment when ill, respectively. yˆ (q, w¯) critical income of marginal public hospital patient.
diagrammatic representation of the rational expectations
equilibria in Fig. 2 requires, in  addition to the restrictions
on preferences given in  part  (ii)(a) in Proposition 1, that
waiting for treatment does not affect patient income (part
(ii)(b)). This implies either that patients are fully compen-
sated by the insurance scheme for loss of earnings or that
there is no loss of earnings. But if there is loss of earn-
ings which is fully compensated from the insurance fund,
then the reduction in  waiting time from the introduction
of  a reward for capacity will reduce the expected insur-
ance cost and welfare will increase. Thus the first best can
be achieved using only a prospective output price only
with strong restrictions on preferences (requirement (a)
in Proposition 3) and if there is  no loss of earnings when
waiting for treatment (requirement (b) in Proposition 3).
The strong conditions on preferences and the effect
of illness on incomes imply that a welfare loss is  likely
when the only instrument is the prospective output price.
The output price leads the hospital to  take account of
the effect of its quality and capacity decisions because
patient demand is affected by quality and the distribu-
tion of waiting times. The effects of quality and capacity
decisions on demand depend on the preferences of the
marginal patients with income yˆ
e
(q, s) who are indifferent
between the public and private sectors. The responses of
these marginal patients will not convey the right informa-
tion about the marginal value of the public hospital quality
and capacity decisions for the infra-marginal patients with
y  < yˆ
e
(q, s) unless all patients have the same marginal rates
of  substitution between quality and waiting times.
As Spence (1975) noted, this type of problem will arise
in all markets, competitive or not, where consumers care
about attributes of the commodity other than its price. In
Spence (1975) consumers pay for the commodity and a
monopoly will produce the socially optimal quality only
if all consumers have the same marginal rate of substi-
tution between income and quality so that the demand
response to higher quality, from the marginal patient, con-
veys accurate information about its effect on  infra-marginal
patients. In our case patients “pay” for public hospital
care by waiting and an output price will induce the hos-
pital to chose the optimal mix  of quality and capacity
only if marginal and infra-marginal patients have the same
marginal rate of substitution between quality and waiting
time.
Consider, for example, minor skin procedures. Patients
will be able to work whilst waiting for treatment (so that
cIe ≡ 0). If lower income patients are more willing to  sac-
rifice quality (cosmetic effects) for a  shorter wait, then
the demand response of the marginal patient (es/
e
q =
−
dq
ds
∣∣
de=0
)  will provide a misleadingly high signal about
the willingness of infra-marginal patients to  accept a longer
wait in exchange for higher quality: quality will be too high
and waiting times too long.
The second reason why a  prospective output price may
not  implement the first best is the effect of waiting on
earnings. If patients are less productive whilst waiting
for treatment (ℓ(y) > 0) and there is incomplete earnings
insurance (r(ℓ(y)) < ℓ(y)) then, from Proposition 1, the
marginal rate of substitution between quality and capac-
ity of marginal and infra-marginal patients will differ and
the hospital will receive the wrong demand signals about
the mix of quality and capacity. But, even if there is  full
compensation for loss of earnings (r(ℓ(y)) =  ℓ(y)), the hos-
pital will still choose the wrong mix  of q and s because it
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Fig. 3. Welfare increasing cost subsidy (ϕ > 0) or penalty (ϕ < 0). pSB

second best price with no  cost subsidy. Is , Iq contours of s(p, ϕ), q(p,  ϕ) chosen by
provider. If Aeq < 0, A
e
s > 0 welfare increased by cost subsidy at (i) and by cost penalty at  (iv). If A
e
q > 0, A
e
s <  0 welfare increased by cost penalty at  (ii)  and
by cost subsidy at  (iii).
ignores the effect of its decisions on the cost of insurance
cIe(q, s).35
4. Second best incentives
We  now consider a  second best world in  which quality
and capacity decisions are not observable and the assump-
tions set out in Proposition 4 do not hold. First, in Section
4.1 we derive the second best optimal output price on
the assumption that  this is only policy instrument avail-
able. Then, in Section 4.2 we  allow for the possibility that
managerial effort can affect hospital costs and show that
linking payment to  both output and hospital cost is welfare
increasing, though, in contrast to the previous literature, it
is possible that hospital cost should be taxed rather than
subsidised.
4.1. Second best output price
When the regulator’s only instrument is the prospec-
tive output price p the hospital’s objective function is
p(q, s) + ˛B
e(q, s)  − ce(q, s) and its choices q(p) and
s(p)  satisfy the first order conditions
p
e
z + ˛B
e
z = c
e
z ,  (z = q, s). (30)
The regulator chooses her only instrument p to satisfy
0 =
dAe
dp
= Aeq
dq
dp
+ Aes
ds
dp
. (31)
Using the definition of the RMSBs (19), the hospital’s first
order conditions (30),  and the definition d
∗
dp
def
= eq
dq
dp
+
es
ds
dp
, (31) is equivalent to
0 = (Req + ˛B
e
q − c
e
q)
dq
dp
+  (Res + ˛B
e
s − c
e
s )
ds
dp
= (Req − p
e
q)
dq
dp
+  (Res − p
e
s )
ds
dp
= Req
dq
dp
+ Res
ds
dp
−  p
d∗
dp
.
35 The hospital will also ignore the cost to  employers if they insure work-
ers by maintaining their income whilst waiting for treatment.
Replacing Rez by p
FB

z + pFBmmz (z  = q, s)  (cf (20) and
(21)) evaluated at second best quantities and defining
dm∗
dp
def
= mq(q, s)
dq
dp
+ ms(q, s)
ds
dp
where m(q, s)  is  the generic
performance measure used in the first best scheme in
Proposition 2,  yields
Proposition 5. The second best price for output is
pSB =
Req
dq
dp
+ Res
ds
dp
d∗/dp
(32)
= p˜
FB
 + p˜
FB
m
dm∗/dp
d∗/dp
, (33)
where p˜
FB
 , p˜
FB
m are the first best prices attached to output and
the generic measure m, specified by Proposition 1 but evalu-
ated at  the second best decision levels for  (q, s).
The first expression (32) shows pSB

as  a  weighted sum
of the RMSBs from quality and capacity, emphasising the
compromise that the second best output price strikes
between incentives for these two  hospital decisions.36 In
(33)
dm∗/dp
d∗/dp
can be interpreted as the induced marginal
rate of transformation between the performance measure
m and hospital output.37 In the second best, m can no longer
be directly incentivised and so the price on output should
take over some of the rôle played by pm in first best.
4.2. Cost reducing effort
We  have so far  ignored the possibility that managerial
effort by the hospital can reduce its production cost c.  When
the regulator has sufficient instruments to control quality
and capacity she does not need an additional instrument
to control managerial effort. Since managerial effort and
production costs are both  borne by the hospital, effort will
be chosen efficiently to minimise the sum of production
and effort cost.
If  the only policy instrument which can be linked to
quality and capacity is the output price p then an incen-
36
Re
q
dq
dp
+Re
s
ds
dp
d∗/dp
=
(
Re
q
e
q
eq
dq
dp
+
Re
s
e
s
es
ds
dp
)
/
(
eq
dq
dp
+ es
ds
dp
)
.
37 In the case where m(s, q)  = s,
dm∗/dp
d∗/dp
=
ds/dp
d∗/dp
, which is  the marginal
capacity requirement per patient attracted.
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tive linked to production cost could be welfare increasing
despite its distorting effect on managerial effort. Subsi-
dising production cost will reduce the marginal costs of
quality and capacity as perceived by the hospital and so
will provide an  additional instrument to  supplement the
prospective output price. But a  cost subsidy will also reduce
managerial effort and so increase hospital cost at given
quality and capacity. The overall welfare effect of the cost
subsidy will depend on the magnitudes of the resulting
changes in cost, quality and capacity.
Suppose that the hospital cost function is  ce(q, s, )
where   is cost-reducing effort which imposes a  non-
verifiable cost g() on the hospital and that the hospital
is  refunded a fraction ϕ of its production cost.38 Hospital
decisions on q, s and  will depend on ϕ and p.  At ϕ  =  0,
the optimal price pSB

(given in Proposition 5) satisfies
dAe
dp
∣∣∣
ϕ=0
= Aeq
∂q
∂p
+ Aes
∂s
∂p
+ Ae
∂t
∂p
= Aeq
∂q
∂p
+ Aes
∂s
∂p
= 0, (34)
since at ϕ = 0 the hospital chooses  so that  ce + g =
0 which implies Ae = −(1 +  )[c
e
 + g] =  0. The welfare
effect of the introduction of a  cost subsidy is
dAe
dϕ
∣∣∣
ϕ=0
= Aeq
∂q
∂ϕ
+ Aes
∂s
∂ϕ
+  Ae
∂
∂ϕ
= Aeq
∂q
∂ϕ
+  Aes
∂s
∂ϕ
. (35)
In  the second best neither Aeq or A
e
s are zero and a  cost
subsidy will change welfare because it induces changes in
quality and capacity.
The comparative static responses of q  and s  to p and
ϕ are in general ambiguous (see Appendix G) but even if
we make the intuitively plausible assumptions that q and s
both increase with p and ϕ  this is insufficient to determine
the sign of (35). Thus it is  possible that the optimal second
best cost subsidy is  negative: the hospital should pay a tax
on its costs.
To  illustrate, use (34) to substitute for Aeq in (35) and
rearrange to get
dAe
dϕ
|
ϕ=0
= (−Aes
∂s
∂p
/
∂q
∂p
)
∂q
∂ϕ
+ Aes
∂s
∂ϕ
= Aes
∂s
∂p
[−(
∂q
∂ϕ
/
∂q
∂p
) +  (
∂s
∂ϕ
/
∂s
∂p
)]
= Aes
∂s
∂p
[
∂p
∂ϕ
|
dq=0
−
∂p
∂ϕ
|
ds=0
].
The terms
(
∂p/∂ϕ
)∣∣
dq=0
and
(
∂p/∂ϕ
)∣∣
ds=0
are the
slopes of the contours of the hospital’s “supply” func-
tions q(ϕ, p) and s(ϕ, p). In Fig. 3 we make the plausible
assumption that increases in  p and ϕ both increase quality
and capacity so that the contours Iq and Is of q(ϕ, p) and
s(ϕ, p) are negatively sloped. With no cost sharing welfare
is maximised at (0,  pSB

) in both parts of the figure. In part
(a) Is has a more negative slope than Iq and if  Aes > 0 (and
38 The hospital now maximises ˛Be(q, s) + p
e(q, s)  − [(1 −
ϕ)ce(q, s,  ) + g()] and the welfare function is  Ae =  Be(q, s) − (1 +
)[ce(q, s, ) + g() + cIe(q, s)].
hence Aeq < 0) then moving to (i) by introducing a cost sub-
sidy and reducing p will increase welfare. Conversely, if
Aes <  0 (and hence A
e
q > 0) welfare is  increased by moving
to  (ii) with a cost penalty and p > p
SB

. In  part (b) Iq has
a steeper negative slope than Isand welfare is  increased at
(iii) by a  cost subsidy if Aes < 0, A
e
q > 0 and by a cost penalty
at (iv) if Aes > 0,  A
e
q < 0.
39
There is  one case in  which a  cost subsidy or  penalty is
not a  useful policy instrument in the second best. If the
hospital is a  pure profit maximiser (˛  = 0), its choice of q
and s will equate their marginal revenues (p
e
z)  to their
marginal cost ((1 −  ϕ)cez ). If the cost function is  additively
or  multiplicatively separable between effort  and (q, s)  so
that ce(q, s, ) =  c1(q, s)c2() +  c3() and cez = c
1
z (q, s)c
2(),
(z = q, s), we can write the first order conditions on q and
s as
p
(1 −  ϕ)c2()
ez(q, s)  = c
1
z (q, s), (z = q, s) .
Thus, as far as choice of (q,  s) is  concerned, changing the
cost subsidy or penalty is equivalent to  changing the output
price and so does not provide an additional means of con-
trolling (q,  s). And since ϕ /= 0 leads to an inefficient choice
of effort a cost subsidy or penalty will reduce welfare in this
case (Appendix G sets out the detailed analysis). Hence
Proposition 6. If an output price is insufficient to achieve
the first best then welfare can be increased by  a cost subsidy or
tax provided that the cost function is not separable between
managerial effort and (q, s).
The conclusion that subsidising, or taxing, hospital cost
may  increase welfare when there are insufficient instru-
ments to control hospital decisions with a  direct effect on
patients has a  straightforward intuition. The welfare loss
due to  the reduction in effort from a  small cost subsidy
is small because the effort level is initially optimally cho-
sen by the hospital, whereas the welfare gains from the
changes in the hospital decisions directly affecting patients
are non-trivial. In previous analyses of cost sharing (sur-
veyed in Chalkley and Malcomson (2000)) it is assumed
that these hospital decisions have  positive marginal wel-
fare effects and are increased by the cost subsidy so that
welfare is  increased by subsidising cost. For example, in  the
seminal paper on prospective pricing (Ellis and McGuire,
1986)  the number of patients requiring treatment is  exoge-
nously determined, so that with a  prospective price the
hospital, unless it is perfectly altruistic, will skimp on qual-
ity because it is  costly and has no effect on its revenue.
Partial reimbursement of costs reduces the marginal cost
of quality and so induces the hospital to increase qual-
ity. But  since partial cost reimbursement also reduces the
incentive for cost reducing effort the second best mixed
reimbursement scheme trades off  quality and cost reduc-
ing  effort. Despite having two  policy targets (quality and
cost reducing effort) and two policy instruments, the first
best is not achievable in the case considered in Ellis and
McGuire (1986) because, with a  fixed number of patients,
39 In Appendix G we provide an alternative characterisation of dA
e
dϕ
∣∣
ϕ=0
in terms of pFBs .
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the prospective price is equivalent to a  lump sum payment
with no incentive properties: the only instrument which
affects the hospital quality decision is a  cost subsidy.
But when there is  more than one other hospital decision
in addition to cost reducing effort (quality and capacity in
our case) and the regulator has insufficient instruments to
control them all, the marginal welfare effects of some of
these hospital decisions will be positive and some negative,
so that it is possible that cost should be taxed rather than
subsidised in order to increase welfare. Proposition 6 thus
generalises Ellis and McGuire (1986).
5. Conclusion
We have analysed optimal hospital payment schemes
for elective procedures, extending previous analyses to
take account of a  salient and ubiquitous feature of pub-
lic health care systems previously ignored in  the literature:
rationing by waiting time. Longer waiting times delay treat-
ment, can reduce the health benefit from treatment, and
can increase output losses if patients are less productive
whilst waiting.
We developed a  new, general, and analytically tractable,
queueing model with rational expectations. The hospital
chooses quality and capacity (beds, staffing, . . .)  taking
account of their effects on its costs and on demand from
patients. Patient decisions to demand care by joining the
waiting list depend on quality and the equilibrium distri-
bution of waiting times and their decisions give rise to the
equilibrium distribution which thus depends on hospital
and patient decisions.
In general, even in the simplest case in  which there
is a single dimension of quality and a single dimen-
sion of capacity, the first best can only be  achieved if
the prospective output price is supplemented with an
additional instrument. Candidate instruments include pay-
ments linked to capacity or  to quality, or to the average
waiting time, or making the hospital bear some of the cost
of public earnings insurance (Proposition 2 and Examples 1
and 2). Our results thus have implications for the design of
Pay for Performance schemes linking hospital revenue to
measures of quality. They also provide a  justification for
direct regulation of quality or the imposition of waiting
times targets (Propper et al., 2010).
Even when quality only has a  single dimension a
prospective price alone is, in  general, insufficient to  achieve
the first best. There are two difficulties. The first is  Spence
(1975) problem: if the hospital is rewarded only via the
price, its incentives to adjust its quality and capacity deci-
sions depend on their effects on demand and thus on the
preferences over quality and the distribution of waiting
times of the marginal patients. But the welfare conse-
quences of quality and capacity decisions depend on their
effects on the infra-marginal patients. Marginal and infra-
marginal patients will have the same marginal rate of
substitution between quality and waiting times only under
strong separability assumptions about preferences and
only if earnings are not  affected by  the length of wait for
treatment (Proposition 1). The second problem is that the
hospital will ignore the effect of its decisions on the costs of
insuring patients for income lost whilst waiting for treat-
ment. Together these problems imply that a prospective
price alone will support the first best only under the strong
assumptions that preferences are separable and that  wait-
ing for treatment has no effect on patient productivity so
that there is  no insurance of patient income (Proposition
4).
If there are  nq dimensions of quality affecting patient
demand and ns hospital supply decisions which directly
alter  the distribution of waiting times then achieving the
first best will require nq + ns − 1 prices in  addition to a
prospective output price. But if patients care only about
the mean waiting time, so that it is  a  sufficient statistic
for the distribution of waiting times, then the first best
can be  achieved by supplementing the prospective output
price with nq − 1 prices on  quality dimensions and a  price,
probably negative, on the mean waiting time  or by using
the output price and nq prices on the quality dimensions
(Proposition 3).
In the second best, when the regulator can only link
payment to  the number of patients treated, the optimal
price per patient in  general exceeds the first-best price to
reflect the extra revenue the hospital would have obtained
under a  first best incentive payment scheme by increasing
capacity to attract extra patients by reducing waiting times
(Proposition 5).
When the hospital can exert effort to  reduce its costs
it is not  necessary to directly incentivise such effort in
the first best when there are  a sufficient number of prices
attached to hospital decisions since the hospital bears both
production and effort costs. In the second best, welfare
can be increased by linking reward to  the hospital’s cost
and so distorting incentives for cost reducing effort. But,
because patients are affected by both quality and waiting
time, rather than just quality, it is possible that hospital
cost should be surcharged rather than partially reimbursed.
(Proposition 6).
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jhealeco.2019.102277.
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